Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
that the price-matching response, more often than not, results in anti-competitive consequences 1 (Edlin 2002 ).
2
The second primary concern revolves around the incumbent carriers' capacity decisions follow-3 ing LCC entry (or the announcement of planned entry). It has been observed that incumbent 4 carriers often add additional flight frequencies or use larger aircraft on routes entered by low 5 cost carriers (Transportation Research Board 1999), a practice that has been highly controversial.
6
While Ordover and Willig (1998) argue that capacity additions by incumbents are economically 7 rational and can be pro-competitive, Edlin and Farrell (2002) note that in the recent U.S. DOJ 8 vs. American Airlines case, "The government claimed not that American's prices were predatory, 9 but that its expansion of flight schedules-described as 'capacity increase'-was." Likewise, some announced an intention to start operating or has started flying."
13
In this paper, we analyze the price and capacity responses of incumbent hub-and-spoke carriers 14 to LCC entry over the past decade in the U.S. domestic airline industry. We begin by documenting 15 some stylized facts regarding the nature of LCC entry into hub markets, as well as the competitive 16 response they have evoked from incumbent carriers. Using a relatively large sample of LCC entry 17 events, we investigate how prevalent "aggressive" responses by incumbent carriers have been. 18 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we assess the degree to which the "aggressiveness" of an 19 incumbent carrier's response impacts the probability of exit for a new entrant LCC using an probit 20 exit model.
21
"Predatory behavior" is a controversial topic, both in industrial organization theory its the 22 antitrust application. A predatory incumbent responds to an entrant by lowering its prices below 23 its costs, thus forcing the entrant to endure financial losses and eventually exit the market. The 24 source of theoretical contention often centers around the predator's rationale. The incumbent 25 suffers financially from predating, but, a well-established incumbent may be able to sustain itself 26 longer in a war of attrition if it has the a deeper purse than an entrant who may have more limited 27 financial resources. Thus, the financial loss of successful predation is compensated by higher 28 profits after the entrant exits. The promise of recoupment, however, depends on the assumption 29 that no other entrants will threatens profitability immediately after the entrant's exit. Skeptics 30 of predatory pricing date back to McGee (1958) , who questioned the rationality of predatory Ordover and Willig (1981) propose more a general standard that takes into account 2 preconditions of market structure and profitability. 3 We emphasize that our goal is not to determine whether or not incumbent carrier responses 4 have or have not violated U.S. predatory pricing laws. Indeed, an analysis of this sort would require 5 detailed, route-level cost data that is not publicly available. Rather, our goal is to document and 6 empirically assess at more general level the patterns of incumbent capacity and price responses 7 to LCC entry to determine whether or not there have been-as many have alleged-a pattern of 8 aggressive incumbent responses to new entry over the past decade that may have hindered com-9 petition in the industry. We believe that such exercises are useful in assessing the applicability 10 and usefulness of general rules or definitions for evaluating the "unfair exclusionary conduct" of 11 incumbent carriers in the industry.
12
The paper most related to ours in the literature is that of Bamberger and Carlton (1999) , which 13 (among other things) compares the success rate of new entrant LCCs to those of major carriers 14 in newly entered city-pair markets. 6 As part of their analysis, Bamberger and Carlton (1999) 15 also examine the responses of incumbent carriers to LCC entry into hub routes and find that the 16 median response to LCC entry of the incumbents has been surprisingly modest. can be linked to an LCC's decision to exit a market.
28
In addition to Bamberger and Carlton (1999) , there have also been a number of recent papers Other studies of incumbent responses to LCC include Dresner and Windle (1999) and Whinston and Collins (1992).
7 For example, the authors find that incumbent carriers lowered their average fare by median value of 4.7% relative to their pre-entry levels on hub-markets entered by LCCs. Likewise, the authors found that the incumbents reduced the median number of seats offered by 1.2%. 8 Bamberger and Carlton (1999) restrict their analysis to markets less than 750 miles that were entered by LCCs other than Southwest between May 1996 and the end of 1997. precisely when price wars occur and better understanding the factors (i.e., multi-market contact, 5 firm financial condition, etc.) leading to price wars.
6
In general, we find that the typical capacity response by incumbent carriers to LCC entry at 7 their hubs-measured in terms of the percentage increase in available seats and/or flights-has been 8 surprisingly modest. Indeed, in our sample of 370 hub markets entered by LCCs between 1991 9 and 2002, the incumbent introduced roughly 30% fewer seats and flights than the LCC entrant in 10 the four quarters following the quarter of initial entry. Likewise, while the incumbent's average 11 fare typically drops substantially following LCC entry, it falls on average by twenty-six percentage 12 points less than the new entrant's average fare (relative to the incumbent's pre-entry average fare). 13 We also find that incumbent capacity responses to LCC entry have varied widely across carriers.
14 While Northwest and Alaska appear to be the most aggressive (in terms of capacity responses) to 15 LCC entry, American and Continental appear to have the most restrained responses. In fact, both
16
American and Continental reduced-on average-the number of seats offered in hub markets entered 17 by LCCs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we find little evidence that the response of the 18 incumbent carrier has any impact on the likelihood that an LCC's entry proves to be successful.
19
In particular, when an LCC's "success" in a market is defined by whether or not it eventually 20 exits that market, we find that the incumbent's relative capacity response is not an important 21 explanatory factor. In terms of the incumbent's price response, our analysis find that sharp price 22 cuts by the incumbent following LCC entry in fact decrease the probability of the LCC exiting the 23 market.
24
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the data used in our anal-25 ysis and documents some stylized facts about LCC entry and the responses they have evoked from 26 incumbents over the past decade. In Section 3, we estimate LCC probit exit models. Concluding Data on flight frequency and capacity for our analysis is taken from the U.S. DOT's domestic T100 2 database, which records monthly data on all flights completed by the large certified commercial 3 carriers. Fare and passenger data for our analysis is taken from the DOT's OD1B database, a 10% 4 sample of all domestic tickets.
5
Almost all predatory allegations involve the "hub" markets of incumbent carriers. Thus, we 6 focus our attention on markets to and from major hub airports. More formally, our base data 7 set is comprised of all non-directional airport-pair markets greater than 100 miles that (a) include 8 the "hub" of at least one major hub-and-spoke carrier (Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, The set of low cost carriers we consider in our analysis are: Southwest, AirTran/ValuJet, and entrants in most markets and since it is usually not practical for travellers to depart from and 23 
9
The hubs included in our analysis are: Alaska (Seattle), American (Chicago, Dallas, Miami), Continental (Cleveland, Houston, Newark), Delta (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City), Northwest (Detroit, Memphis, Minneapolis), United (Denver, Washington-Dulles, Chicago, San Francisco), US Airways (Charlotte, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh). We exclude America West from our set of incumbent carriers since their cost structure more closely resembles that of the LCCs than other major hub-and-spoke carriers.
10 Our data for AirTran includes ValuJet's data, as AirTran was acquired by ValuJet in 1998 with ValuJet adopting AirTran's name. It is also important to note that all of the entry events in our sample have exclusively used "mainline" (i.e., larger than 100-seat) aircraft such as the Boeing 737, McDonald Douglas DC-9, or Airbus A319/320. Recently, Atlantic Coast Airlines-a large regional carrier-announced plans to convert its business model from regional code-sharing service to a "low cost carrier" model (Independence Air) using predominantly 50-seat regional jet aircraft. Since regional jet aircraft have much higher unit operating costs than the larger, narrow-body jets traditionally used by LCCs, some of our results may not apply to Independence Air's proposed entry.
11 The regional carriers we include are: American Eagle and Executive Airlines (American), Continental Express/Express Jet (Continental), Comair and Atlantic Southeast (Delta), Horizon (Alaska), Mesaba (Northwest) and Air Wisconsin (United). While we were able to include many of the largest regional codesharing carriers, we note that there are a number of regional carriers that were not required to file in the DOT's T100 database during the period we study, such as Pinnacle Airlines (a Northwest Airlines subsidiary) or Atlantic Coast Airlines, which provides regional feed service for both Delta and United. (both incumbent and low-cost) often serve more than one airport in the same metropolitan area.
13

5
In our dataset, an entry event is a unique combination of market, incumbent and entrant. If 6 there are two incumbents and one entrant in one market, for example, we count two separate entry 7 events in this market so that we can observe the responses of both incumbents. Since our data set 8 encompasses thirteen years of data, it is possible for a given LCC to enter the same market more 9 than once and such re-entry is counted as a separate entry event.
14 10 From our base data set, we excluded markets where there was less than four quarters of pre-11 entry data for the incumbent carrier. Likewise, we excluded those markets in which there was 12 less than four quarters of data following the LCC's entry. We also required that a carrier serve a 13 market with at least twenty round-trips per month in order to be included. We define an entry 14 event as four or more consecutive quarters of service by an LCC following at least four quarters 15 where the LCC did not provide service in that market. While we recognize the possibility that 16 there may be a number of legitimate entries where the LCC withdrew prior to serving an entire 17 year, we wanted to minimize the impact of purely seasonal service. In total, our data set includes 370 unique entry events. have established hubs of their own at pre-existing major carrier hub airports.
22
13 The one exception we made was with regards to JetBlue's JFK based operations. In order to study the impact of JetBlue's entry on Continental's Newark based hub markets, we recoded each of JetBlue's JFK based flights as Newark based flights. We recognize that for antitrust purposes, the appropriate market definition is usually assumed to be city-pairs rather than airport pairs. However, for the purpose of our research questions, we felt that it was more important to use a smaller set of entry events by controlling for capacity choices in the manner described above. We acknowledge, however, that our approach does not fully account for all entry in some city-pairs markets involving hub cities such as Washington-Dulles, where there has been substantial entry by LCCs at neighboring Baltimore-Washington Airport (BWI).
14 To account for the large-scale exit of markets by AirTran/ValuJet following the crash of Flight 592 in May 1996 and the temporary grounding of its fleet, we exclude AirTran/ValuJet observations for the third and fourth quarters of 1996 as well as the first quarter of 1997. 15 To test the sensitivity of our results, we have performed all our analysis with another data set in which we require only two quarters of service for valid LCC entries. Neither the signs nor the magnitude of the estimated probit coefficients did changed significantly. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the entry events in our data set by year. Eight carriers in our data set-Sun Country, Vanguard, ProAir, Western Pacific, Markair, Kiwi,
8
Carnival, and Air South-declared bankruptcy during our sample period, while another-Reno-was 9 acquired by American Airlines. 16 Sun Country has since re-emerged from bankruptcy and is once again operating flights to and from Minneapolis. its pre-entry capacity and fare levels. As before, our convention is measure the change in the four 3 quarters following entry relative to the four quarters prior to entry (excluding, once again, the 4 quarter of actual entry from both the numerator and denominator). Thus, the incumbent's flight 5 capacity response to an entry event that occurred during the first quarter of 1996 is defined as:
Some Stylized Facts on LCC Entry and Incumbent Responses
Likewise, the incumbent's seat response and O&D passenger traffic are defined like:
Incumbent's Seats (6)
Finally, the incumbent's fare response is also defined as the percentage decline from its original 8 average fare levels. capacity) into a hub market, the median capacity response by incumbents has only been 4.0%.
6
In terms of averages fares, the median incumbent response has been to reduce its average fares 7 by 15.1% (compared to 49.5% by the entrant). 18 As was the case with Table 3, Table 4 demon-
8
strates that there are significant differences in the median response across the incumbent carriers. increased seat capacity by more than 10%. In terms of average fare reductions, Delta's median 12 fare reduction relative to its pre-entry levels has been the largest (25.3%), while American's has 
Relative Responses Statistics
15
The median response statistics in Table 4 smaller its value (in absolute value), the less aggressive the incumbent's fare response. Table 5   24 18 It is important to note that one should not-in general-expect that the incumbent's average fares will drop as much as the entrant's, since the incumbent carriers typically offer both coach as well as first class service.
summarizes the median relative response measures for each of the incumbent carriers. The first thing to notice from Table 5 is that most median relative responses statistics are strongly 4 negative. In all categories, the entrants' scale and price cuts outpace the responses of the incum- seats relative to the entrant. Indeed, Table 5 shows that American-on average-has added 35.9%
8 fewer seats than the LCC entrants it has faced. Northwest, on the other hand, has been the most 9 aggressive in terms of capacity responses, adding on average 13.2% fewer seats than the LCC en-10 trant. The primary difference between Table 4 and Table 5 with respect to capacity responses is for
11
Alaska. While Table 4 indicates that Alaska tends to add the most seats of all the incumbents (its 12 median value of I i (Seats) is 12.9%), Table 5 shows that its median relative seat response (30.1%) 13 is on par with overall median (29.6%). This suggests that in the Seattle hub markets where Alaska 14 has faced LCC entry, the LCC has tended to enter with relatively high levels of capacity.
15
Turning now to the relative fare responses, Table 5 Delta's hub markets tend to do so with very large fare reductions. 
Capacity and Fare Interactions between Incumbents and Entrants
23
Although the relative response statistics in Table 5 as well as service quality, the flights and seats variables tend to be highly correlated in our data 4 set. Consequently, for the remainder of our analysis, we chose seats as our primary measure of 5 capacity.
6 Figure 1 plots the incumbent's fare response I i (Fares) relative to the entrant's E i (Fares) in 7 each of our 370 entry events. As in the previous section, the unit of observation is a market-8 incumbent-entrant. The diagonal line in Figure 1 indicates a "perfectly matched" response by the 9 incumbent.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
11
In general, the incumbents' fare responses tend to be smaller than the entrants (i.e., the data 12 lie below the 45 degree line). While this may partly reflect the generally "modest" price responses 13 by incumbents, it may also reflect the limitation of using average fares. There are two reasons 14 why the average fare may not reflect the full picture of price competition. First, incumbent "full which the entrant chooses a capacity level of 50% or more of incumbent's pre-entry capacity.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
33
In summary, we find that the response of incumbent carriers to LCC entry-both in terms of 
Exit Events
21
We define an "exit" as four or more consecutive quarters of absence from a market. Since we 22 are interested in assessing the impact of incumbent responses (rather than other extraordinary 23 exogenous events) on LCC exit probability, we needed to take into consideration a number of
24
"exit" events that were primarily caused by other factors. In particular, we excluded two exit 25 events from our dataset that came as a result of American's acquisition of Reno Air. Likewise,
26
since we excluded AirTran data for three quarters directly following the crash of one its aircraft in 27 May 1996 (which resulted in the subsequent temporary grounding of its fleet), some of the markets
28
where AirTran temporarily suspended service are not counted as formal exits. 19 To minimize the 29 potential for "right censoring" in our data set, we dropped entry events from our data set that
The markets that AirTran withdrew from for more than seven quarters were counted as exits.
occurred after 2000. Finally, we exclude markets that were exited as a result of the cessation of 1 service due to bankruptcy. 20 2 LCC exits from markets are not an uncommon phenomena. Indeed, after modifying our entry-3 event data set as described above, our data set includes 265 entry events, of which 89 were exited.
4 Table 6 summaries the exit events by entrant and incumbent and demonstrates-not surprisingly-
5
that there are significant firm differences in terms of entry success. For example, of the 14 hub 6 markets that JetBlue has thus far entered, none have been exited. 21 Likewise, Southwest only 7 exited three of sixty-seven hub markets it entered in our data set.
8 Table 6 : Cross Tabulation of Market Exits by Incumbent and LCC 
Profile of Exit Events
12
Since exit from a market by an LCC is not an uncommon event, it is useful to profile some basic 13 stylized facts of "successful" versus "unsuccessful" entry attempts. Table 7 compares the entry and 14 response characteristics of the market events in our sample broken down by exited and non-exited 15 events.
16
20 Note that this does not imply that we exclude all market exits by carriers that are now bankrupt, since markets that were exited in the years prior to bankruptcy are still are still included in our sample. To test the sensitivity of our results, we also performed our probit analysis including the bankruptcy events. Neither the signs nor the magnitudes of any of our estimated coefficients changed significantly. 21 We note that JetBlue recently announced that it would exit the Atlanta-Long Beach and Atlanta-Oakland markets. Since JetBlue entered these markets in late 2002, these entry events were not part of our data set. tend to be slightly smaller (median of 3.5%) in exit events versus successful entries (median 4.5%).
8
Equally surprisingly is the fact that there is no discernable difference in the incumbents' price 9 reductions between successful and failed LCC entries. As alluded to earlier, in light of the highly 10 differentiated fare structures of incumbent carriers, we recognize the difficulty of determining the 11 nature of price competition using the average fares alone. Nevertheless, it appears as though the 12 magnitudes of the incumbents' capacity and price cuts may not be significant factors in determining 13 which market entries eventually fail. We investigate this possibility in the probit exit model in the 14 following section.
15 Table 8 compares some raw pre-entry market characteristics (O&D passengers, seats, and that typically rely on a large base of O&D (rather than connecting) traffic were not able to sustain 21 themselves in those markets. 
22
Exit Probit Models
26
In order to determine if LCC exit choices are systematically related to the competitive behavior 27 of incumbents prior to their exit, we estimate a basic probit model using I i (Seats) and I i (Fare)
28
as two of our independent variables. 23 The dependent variable D(LCC Exit) takes the value 1
The figures in Table 8 are quarterly averages from the four quarters prior to the entry. 23 When calculating the incumbent's post-entry pricing/capacity decisions, we compute the average value using quarters when the LCC is present in the market. Obviously, an LCC's withdrawal from a market is likely to if the LCC exited the market and 0 otherwise. If aggressive responses by incumbents are partly 1 responsible for the eventual withdrawal of the LCC, we expect the coefficients for these variables 2 to be strongly positive and statistically significant. Since the incumbent's responses should be 3 measured relative to the that of the entrant, we also include the entrants' capacity and pricing 4 choices, E i (Seats) and E i (Fare), as control variables. Moreover, we are interested in determining if 5 any particular entry style (i.e., small capacity, aggressive price cutting) contribute to higher failure 6 probabilities than others. We chose not to include the flight frequency variables (E i (Trips) and 7 I i (Trips)) in our estimations since they are highly correlated with E i (Seats) and I i (Seats).
8
We perform two separate probit estimations: one with Southwest and one without Southwest.
9
As discussed earlier, Southwest is by far the largest LCC and has an extremely low exit rate.
10
By presenting two samples, we check the sensitivity of our results to the presence or absence of 
Other Independent Variables
13
In addition to the price and capacity choices of the incumbent and entrant, we include several 14 other market characteristics that we believe may influence the success or failure of entrants. When 15 applicable, these variables are defined using the pre-entry market data averaged over the four 16 quarters prior to entry in order to account for possible effects of seasonality.
17
It it well understood that LCCs have traditionally focused on serving pre-existing high density Furthermore, it is possible that some passengers may find the lower level of in-flight amenities 24 offered by LCCs acceptable on short-haul flights, but less acceptable on longer-haul flights. Thus, 25 we include ln(distance), the natural logarithm of the market's distance in miles.
26
It is natural to suspect that well-established LCCs with large national footprints may have 27 higher success probabilities than smaller, regional LCCs. In the long-purse story of predation, for definition, occurs on an airport/city-pair basis in our model, we also include LCC Scope, which is 1 defined as the mean number of destinations served by the LCC from both endpoints of the market 2 entered. Finally, in order to control for systematic incumbent differences beyond those captured by our 11 response variables I i (Seats) and I i (Fare), we include incumbent carrier dummies (with Alaska
12
Airlines being the base case).
13
Summary statistics for our independent variables are provided in Table 9 . 
14
Estimation Results
1
Estimation results from our probit model are summarized in Table 10 below. Also noteworthy is the negative and significant estimated coefficient on ln(distance). This 17 result, which is contrary to our expectation, indicates that the longer the market's distance, the 18 lower the exit probability. We caution inferring too much from this result however, as LCC entry
2
19
into longer-haul markets is a rather recent phenomena. 25 Moreover, the result may be related to 20 the fact that JetBlue, which has the longest average route length among all of the LCCs, did not 21 experienced any exits in our data set. As expected, larger pre-existing market size measured by 22 ln(O&D Pax) reduces the probability of exit, confirming well known result that LCCs are able 23 to leverage their comparative advantage by targeting pre-existing dense markets.
24
As expected, the larger the LCC's absolute size and the larger the number of destinations 25 that the LCC serves at the end-point cities of a market, the smaller the probability of eventual 26 exit. However, while the estimated coefficient on LCC Scope is significant at the 5% level, the to explain such outcomes, however, one needs to devise a model that accounts for more subtle 8 strategic interactions between incumbents and entrants. 26 Although anecdotal evidence of such practices is common, questions remains as to how 21 prevalent those aggressive incumbent behaviors have been. This paper attempts to provide some 22 empirical evidence to answer this question using a broad sample of market entry events.
23
We find that highly aggressive incumbent reactions are more the exception rather than the 24 rule. Moreover, we find-somewhat surprisingly-that the median response of incumbents to LCC 25 entry at their hubs has tended to be fairly accommodating. Based on our analysis of 370 market 26 entry events, we find that while the incumbent often aligns their price to that of entrant, it rarely 27 undercuts the entrant's average fares. As for the capacity response of incumbents, we find no clear 28 evidence that incumbents try to out-pace or even match the entrant's capacity choice. This is 29 contrary to the common perception that the incumbent response of aggressively expanding their 30 capacity following LCC entry is a widespread phenomena. In this sense, our results support the 31 conclusion of Bamberger and Carlton (1999) using an expanded scope of the data.
32
Perhaps the most important finding of our analysis, however, is that we found no evidence that 1 an incumbent's capacity expansion or pricing decisions following LCC entry negatively impacts 2 the probability that the LCC exits a market. Rather, factors such as the entrant's capacity choice, 3 pre-existing market density and the LCC's pre-entry presence at the endpoints of a market appear 4 to be factors which contribute to an entrant's ultimate success or failure. Thus, from a policy 5 perspective, our results suggest that rather than focussing on the nature of post-entry competition 6 between incumbents and entrants, policy-makers should be more concerned with ensuring that
7
LCCs have sufficient access to airport facilities such as gates. Indeed, LCC access to gates at some 8 highly congested hub-airports, is likely to be a topic of heated discussion in the policy arena. It is important to note that the competitive confrontation between the hub-and-spoke incum- Beach and Atlanta-Oakland markets. 29 The primary lesson from our analysis, however, is that a 16 cut-and-dry rule of capacity expansion or price reduction is unlikely to define-in any meaningful 17 or economically appropriate way-"predatory" or "exclusionary" conduct. 18 27 For example, Huston (1999) argue that the number of gates in the hub-airports is the key determinant of long-run equilibrium in the industry.
28 As of November 30, 2003 for example, Southwest's market capitalization exceeded the sum of all other major carriers combined and JetBlue's market capitalization exceeded that of any of the legacy hub-and-spoke carriers. 
